The LED is a new lightweight cipher, which was published in CHES 2011. This cipher could be applied in the Wireless Sensor Network to provide security. On the basis of the single byte-oriented fault model, we propose a differential fault analysis on the LED cipher. The attack could recover its 64-bit secret key by introducing 4 faulty ciphertexts, and 128-bit secret key by introducing 8 faulty ciphertexts. The results in this study will be beneficial to the analysis of the same type of other iterated lightweight ciphers.
Introduction
The LED is a new Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) lightweight cipher published in CHES 2011 1 . It has a good compact hardware implementation and software-friendly features, and thus could be applied in the sensor network, RIFD tag deployment and other application characterized by highly-constrained devices.
The strength of the LED cipher against various classical cryptanalysis has been analyzed, including differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, algebraic attack and so on 1 .
Other than classical cryptanalysis, differential fault analysis (DFA) is a new class of cryptanalysis on cryptographic devices. It was first proposed by E. Biham and A. Shamir on DES 2 in 1997. The similar attacks have been applied to AES [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , Triple-DES 9 , RC4 10 , Camellia 11 , ARIA 12 , SMS4 [13] [14] , PRESENT 15 and so on. The DFA exploits easily accessible information like input-output behavior under malfunctions, amplifies and evaluates the leaked information with the help of mathematical methods. It is based on deriving information about the secret key by examining the differences between a cipher resulting from correct operation and a cipher of the same initial message resulting from faulty operation. This analysis is often much more powerful than classical cryptanalysis. As for the SPN block ciphers, there are two types of DFA methods, which relate to the recovery of subkeys:
(i) The bit number of the fault is less than or equals to that of the input of an S-box. For example, the fault is one bit or byte, while the input of an S-box is one byte. In this case, one fault's diffusion affects at most one S-box in the inducing round, and the fault propagation path is simple. Thus, it is not difficult for the attackers to derive the relationship between the subkeys and the ciphertext difference. Many studies have been conducted on the security of these SPN block ciphers against the DFA 3-8, 12, 15 .
(ii) The bit number of the fault is greater than that of the input of an S-box. For example, the fault is a random byte, while the input of an S-box is 4 bits. Thus, the fault propagation paths may intersect each other. Thus it is not easy to deduce the relationship between the secret key and the ciphertext difference. For example, The LED is such a representative SPN block cipher which chooses 4 bits as a processing unit and its input of an S-box has 4 bits for the high efficiency in software and hardware. In the real circumstances, it is usual for the DFA attacker to choose the singlebyte oriented fault model to deduce the subkeys and the secret key for its easy implementation and general applications. However, few studies have been done on the single byte differential fault analysis on the LED cipher.
In this study, we propose a single byte differential fault analysis method to recover the secret key of LED. The method could induce one-byte errors into the encryption. Both the locations and the values of the errors are unknown. By retrieving the related values of subkeys, our method requires 4 and 8 ciphertexts to recover the 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys of LED, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the LED cipher. The next section describes the basic assumption and basic idea of DFA. Then section 4 proposes our DFA analysis to recover the secret key. Section 5 summarizes the attacking complexity. Section 6 shows the experimental results of the DFA on LED. Finally section 7 concludes the paper.
Description of the LED Cipher
The LED is a 64-bit SPN block cipher with two primary instances taking 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys. It has l rounds, which is 32 for LED-64 and 48 for LED-128 as Fig. 1 shows. The cipher is composed of encryption, decryption and the key schedule. 
Encryption
The LED could be pictured as a rectangular array of 4 bits, having four rows and four columns. Let X be the plaintext and Y be the ciphertext. 
Decryption
The decryption is the same as that of encryption, including the subkeys with the same order.
Key Schedule
The secret key K is the input of a key schedule to produce the subkeys for each round. In LED-64, the relationship between the secret key K and the subkey K 1 is as follows:
(1) In LED-128, the relationship among the secret key K, the subkeys K 1 and K 2 is as follows: 1 2 || .
3. Basic Idea of Our Attack
The Basic Assumption
The DFA analysis exploits the difference between a normal and a faulty ciphertext stemming from encryptions of the same plaintext. Our proposed fault model includes the following two assumptions: (i) The attacker has the capability to choose one plaintext to encrypt and obtain the corresponding right and faulty ciphertexts (Chosen Plaintext Attack, CPA). (ii) The attacker could induce a single byte error to one transformation. However, the location of this byte in this round and the value of the error are both unknown.
The Basic Idea
The main procedure of this attack is as follows: (i) The right ciphertext is obtained when a plaintext is encrypted with a secret key.
(ii) We induce a random error in the l-2-th round of the encryption, and thus obtain a faulty ciphertext. By differential analysis, the value of the last subkey K 1 can be recovered. If the key size is 64 bits, then jump step (iv); else jump step (iii). (iii) A random error is induced in the l-6-th round of the encryption, we could decrypt the right ciphertext by the subkey K 1 to obtain the input of the last four round, which is the output of the fifth round from the end. Repeat the same procedure to deduce the subkey K 2 . (iv) The secret key K could be deduced on the basis of the key schedule.
Single Byte Differential Fault Analysis on LED

Notations
The following notations are used to describe the LED and its analysis. The relationship between the input difference and output difference in the SubCells transformation is defined as follows:
where the S represents a 4×4 substitution in the SubCells layer. 
Attacking Procedure
In this subsection, we apply the above basic idea and propose a novel differential fault analysis to recover the secret keys of LED-64 and LED-128. Our analysis is split into the following four successive steps:
(i) A ciphertext Y is derived when an arbitrary plaintext X is encrypted with a secret key K. (ii) This step aims at recovering K 1 in the last round.
The fault injection targets at the l-2-th round. As Fig. 2 shows, a fault may be induced on either AC l-2 , SC l-2 or SR l-2 whereas the approach is identical in either case. Note that any modification of one byte provokes the XOR-
We can observe that
) )= ， (5) The output difference of the j-th S-box in the l-th round could be represented by ,
The transformation between inputs difference and outputs difference of the SubCells transformation is defined in the l-th round as below:
.
The above equation, in conjunction with a pair of right and faulty ciphertexts, allow to infer a relation between
It is helpful to restrict a list of possible candidates for the value of 1 .
K The MixColumnsSerial layer propagates one single byte fault to four-byte differences in the input of the SubCells transformation. If we do brute force search for the input of the SubCells transformation, the complexity to recover one subkey is up to 2 64 . This kind of search is not really practical.
We propose an effective approach to select the input difference of the SubCells transformation, so the input of the SubCells transformation could be obtained with less complexity. We take the derivation of l AC as an example. We observe that one single byte error can lead to two 4-byte differences independently after the computation of the diffusion layer in 
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Attacking Complexity
We summarize the attacking procedure to select subkey candidates for the 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys. The time complexity of brute-force search for one fault injection is
()
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where n denotes the size of the SubCells transformation, s denotes the input size of one S-box, and x denotes the number of S-boxes in parallel. In addition, an estimation of the number of faults necessary for the attack to be successful is vital. In the attacking procedure, the number of faulty ciphertexts to recover a subkey depends on the fault location and the fault model.
We take the derivation of 1 K as an example. On the property of the SubCells layer, if 1 K is a subkey candidate, then 1 l K MC ⊕ Δ may be another subkey candidate. In other words, if the input candidates set of S-boxes is not null, then the input l AC may have several candidates. Thus, there are some candidates of l MC . It indicates that 1 K may have some possible elements. In the single-byte fault model, a random error could be induced at any round of the encryption. If the fault occurs in the last round, then only one single byte in the input of the SubCells transformation will change, which could recover at most one byte of the last subkey by DFA. To recover the last subkey, it is necessary to induce many errors into different bytes.
If the fault is induced at an ideal location before the last round, then the inputs difference and outputs difference of the SubCells transformation in this round contain only one nonzero byte. However, the output difference of ShiftRows and MixColumnsSerial has multibytes owing to the diffusion of linear transformation. Thus, the input difference of MixColumnsSerial in the last round contains multibytes after the computation of the last several rounds. The above idea is applied in the attacking procedure to improve the efficiency of fault injection.
Since at least two errors can make one element in the intersection of K 1 , we continue deriving intersection of subkey candidates sets until the intersection has only one element. Thus, at least two fault ciphertexts are required to derive multibytes of one subkey. The theoretical minimum number of faulty ciphertexts to recover one subkey is defined as 0 m = 0 ,
where n represents the size of the SubCells layer, and m represents the maximum number of bits in a subkey derived by two faulty ciphertexts. To derive the subkey, the value of m equals the number of bits in the nonzero output difference of the nonlinear transformation in this round. If 0 m = , then there is no bits of a subkey derived and thus 0 w = . Thus, the overall attacking complexity to recover a secret key is 
where g denotes the number of subkeys to recover a secret key, n denotes the size of the SubCells layer, s denotes the input size of one S-box, x denotes the number of S-boxes in parallel and m represents the maximum number of bits in a subkey derived by two faulty ciphertexts.
For a 64-bit secret key, the attacking complexity in theory is about 
where g=1, n=64, x=4, s=4, m=64, and v=2. For a 128-bit secret key, the attacking complexity in theory is about 2 26
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for g=2, n=64, x=4, s=4, m=64, and v=2.
Experimental Results
We implemented our attack on a PC using Visual C++ 8.0 Compiler on a 2.53 GHz celeron with 2GB memory. The fault induction was simulated by computer software. In this situation, we ran the attack algorithm to 1000 encryption unit with a random generated key. Fig. 4 shows the number of subkey candidates in three intersections of subkey candidates to recover one subkey. We define accuracy, reliability and latency for evaluating the experimental results in detail. . Thus, the 3rd intersection of subkey candidates is completely accurate, and we could derive the subkey in this intersection. That is, 4 fault ciphertexts are required to recover one subkey. Furthermore, the accuracy in every group for the same interaction is similar or equal. Reliability is the ratio of successful experiments out of all experiments made. If the attacker could derive only one subkey, the experiment is successful. Referring to Table 2 , it is observed that the ratio of successful experiments in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd intersections of subkey candidates are 0, 65.6% and 100%, respectively. That is, the reliability is 100% if the attacker induces 4 random faults to break a subkey. Furthermore, the reliability in every group for the same interaction is similar or equal.
Latency is the time from the first fault injection to the recovery of the subkey in our software simulation. It is measured in seconds. Fig. 5 shows that the latency of 1000 experiments. The time of 74.5% experiments is between 0.1s and 0.2s.
Thus, 4 faulty ciphertexts are required to recover one subkey. The proposed DFA method requires 4 faulty ciphertexts to recover the 64-bit secret key and 8 faulty ciphertexts to recover 128-bit secret keys. 
to break the LED-64 and LED-128 by the single byte differential fault analysis, respectively.
Conclusion
This paper examines single byte differential fault analysis on LED in software implementation. It shows that LED is vulnerable to the single byte differential fault analysis. In the byte-oriented fault model, only 4 or 8 ciphertexts in average is required to obtain the 64-bit and 128-bit secret key of LED, respectively. Our work provides a new reference to fault analysis on other block ciphers.
In consequence, we are working on fault analysis on LED in hardware implementation. Furthermore, future analysis should be able to support more fault locations of LED, such as the key schedule.
